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Comparative Intellectual Histories of Early Modern Asia43
Sheldon Pol lock
To be sure, knowledge always begins in specific places, and one of our 
aims was to share new knowledge about 
ideas and intellectual practices in the 
places we study. But more crucial and 
challenging was it to address the three 
critical problems embedded in the title 
to the class, problems that are either 
only now coming under study, or are 
understudied, or even unstudied:
• What sense does it make to speak 
of early modernity in the sphere of 
mental life outside the early modern 
West—that is, in Asia in the several 
centuries preceding European expan-
sion? What problems do we face in 
defining such modernity? Is ‘early 
modernity’ a useful concept in writ-
ing the history of Asian thought? 
• What are the special tasks, methods, 
or theoretical commitments that con-
stitute intellectual history as a separate 
and valid form of knowledge? Does 
the intellectual history of early-mod-
ern Asia have tasks, methods or theo-
retical commitments that differenti-
ate it from the study of intellectual 
history as developed from European 
materials? Is there an unacknowl-
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The Master Class on “Comparative Intellectual 
Histories of the Early Modern World” was held 
at the International Institute for Asian Studies in 
Leiden in May-June, 2006. The idea of a master 
class – assembling a team of scholars to discuss 
recent advances in a field with doctoral and 
postdoctoral students – is the brain child of IIAS’s 
former director, Wim Stokhof, and I express my 
thanks to him for his vision and energy in making 
this intellectual experiment possible.
I say experiment because none of the participants, 
the instructors included, had ever engaged in 
this kind of comparative intellectual-historical 
conversation. As Michael Cook confessed, although 
he works with Benjamin Elman in the very same 
building at Princeton University, the two had never 
previously exchanged ideas on problems shared 
across their regions. It was just this sort of non-
communication – fallout from the division of the 
world of knowledge into studies of areas – that the 
class was designed in part to address. 
edged link between the events of 
European intellectual history and 
what are seen as ‘general’ methods of 
intellectual history?
• What are the aims and methods of a 
comparative intellectual history of the 
early modern world? How do we do 
it, and what precisely are we trying to 
discover when we do do it?
I can’t address all these questions – the 
assembled essays here collectively do so 
in their different ways – but will offer 
only a summary of my introductory 
remarks. I can be relatively brief about 
‘early modernity’ and ‘intellectual his-
tory’ since our specific challenge was 
coming to terms with the problem of 
comparativism.
The uses and abuses of ‘early 
modernity’
Early modernity has been a much dis-
puted topic of conversation among 
scholars of Asia for the past decade, 
both regionalists and generalists. Many 
object to the apparent teleology of the 
idea, committing us as it is supposed 
to do to some inevitable developmental 
goal (so Randolph Starn). Of course, 
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our inquiry is perforce ‘teleological’ in 
the sense of aiming to understand what 
occurred in the past that enabled us to 
get us to the telos – if that is still the 
right word here – we have gotten to. 
There is no way to forget the end of this 
story just because we concentrate on the 
beginning – indeed, we wouldn’t even 
know where to begin the story if we 
didn’t know how it has ended because 
we wouldn’t know what the story was. 
Others object that many so-called early 
modernities never became full moder-
nities except when mediated through 
western modernisation. But what if 
western modernisation short-circuited 
other processes of transformation? No 
given present was bound to come out 
of any given past; but our present has 
come out, and we want to know how 
and why it has.
Few deny that over the three centuries 
up to 1800 Eurasia as a whole witnessed 
unprecedented developments: the open-
ing of sea passages that were global for 
the first time in history, and of networks 
of trade and commodity-production 
for newly global markets; spectacular 
demographic growth (the world’s popu-
lation doubled); the rise of large stable 
states; the diffusion of new technologies 
(gunpowder, printing) and crops from 
the Americas. If this is a list (borrowed 
from John Richards) of what is sup-
posed to make life ‘modern’ rather than 
just new or different, what part of the 
world failed to experience early moder-
nity? On the other hand, if we descend 
from that broad definition of the early 
modern to the narrow – the presence 
of fossil-fuel technology, constitutional 
governance, and religious freedom and 
secularisation (Jack Goldstone’s view) 
– there will be no case of early moder-
nity aside from Britain. We may instead 
argue that modernity is additionally, or 
exclusively, a condition of conscious-
ness. But what kind of consciousness? 
If we stipulate this a priori in light of 
European experience – a new sense of 
the individual, a new scepticism, a new 
historical sensibility, to name three 
Master Categories – and go forth to find 
them, we are likely to succeed, since you 
usually find what you are looking for. 
Or conversely, if we set out to find them 
– an Indian Montaigne, a Chinese Des-
cartes, an Arab Vico – and somehow do 
not, well, too bad then, there will be no 
pre-European Asian modernity at all.
A good deal of current discussions of 
early modernity is irrelevant, I suggest, 
for the purposes of our master class, 
or even an obstruction; as Frederick 
Cooper argues, the notion of modernity 
has had an important historical role in 
making claims, but is virtually useless 
as an analytic concept. We are therefore 
perfectly justified in seeking to under-
stand how various the world was at the 
moment before what would become the 
dominant form of modernity – coloni-
al, capitalist, western – achieved global 
ascendancy (even if that question can 
only be posed in the moment after). 
We can call it ‘early modern’ simply in 
the sense of a threshold, where poten-
tially different futures may have been 
arrested (or retained only as masala for 
that dominant form). But we can go fur-
ther. Since the material world changed 
dramatically during the few centuries 
before this threshold, and changed uni-
versally, there is good reason to ask how 
the systems devised for knowing the 
world responded – or why they failed to 
respond – to the world that was chang-
ing objectively between these dates. At 
the same time there is good reason to 
resist the teleology – here indeed an 
infelicity – in the term ‘early modern’ 
and so refuse to assign this period any 
shared structure or content a priori, let 
alone to insist on finding in it western 
modernity in embryonic form (the Chi-
nese Descartes). The trap of definitional 
consistency is precisely what we need 
to avoid, as my remarks on comparison 
will make clear. 
In short, the period constitutes an 
entirely reasonable framework for a 
comparative intellectual history, with-
out leading us to posit any necessary 
uniformity in the history of intellection 
that transpired. Everyone began to par-
ticipate in a new world economy, to live 
in new, larger, and more stable states, 
to confront a demographic explosion, 
a diffusion of new technology, vaster 
movements of people in a newly uni-
fied world. How did people experience 
these transformations in the realm of 
thought? That is what we need to dis-
cover. I think there may be remarkable 
parallels awaiting discovery, aside from 
the shocking parallel that the period 
– empty vestibule, it has been thought, 
between high tradition and westerniza-
tion – is all but unstudied everywhere. 
But we should not worry if they are not 
found. A ‘negative’ outcome, say, of 
stability in the face of dynamic change 
elsewhere – producing a global version 
of what Ernst Bloch saw as moderni-
ty’s constitutive ‘Gleichzeitigkeit des 
Ungleichzeitigen’ (a multiplex simul-
taneity of things that are non-simul-
taneous) – would be as important as a 
‘positive’ one, since we are interested in 
knowing why people may wish to pre-
serve forms of knowledge in the face of 
changing objects of knowledge no less 
than in knowing why they may be pre-
pared to change them. 
The life and death of 
intellectual history
Probably no subfield of the discipline of 
history has experienced a more precipi-
tous decline in the past generation than 
intellectual history. In Chinese studies, 
the retreat from intellectual into social 
history seems widely symptomatic of a 
broader trend. (In Indian studies intel-
lectual history never really existed as a 
theorised scholarly practice, so there 
was nothing to retreat from.) Com-
parative intellectual history has fared 
even worse – in fact, it is hard to claim 
the practice even exists in any accept-
able, historical form (comparisons of 
Shankara and Heidegger, for example, 
in this sense fall entirely outside intel-
lectual history). Notwithstanding the 
relative indifference toward it, intel-
lectual history and what I will suggest 
is its necessary complement, compara-
tive intellectual history, constitute an 
important new horizon on the terrain 
of early modern Eurasian history and, 
I would even claim, the foundation for 
any future study of modernity or coloni-
al transformations. We cannot possibly 
understand what changes colonialism 
and capitalist modernity wrought in 
Asia – in the social, political, scientif-
ic, aesthetic or other sphere – without 
understanding what was there, in the 
domain of concepts, to be changed.
One measure of the relative health of a 
field is the state of its self-reflection. In 
intellectual history so little work of this 
sort is being done these days that the 
case might seem beyond hope. Certainly 
scholars continue to write about Bacon, 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. But no 
serious new conceptualisation of what 
it means to do intellectual history has 
appeared (so far as I know) in several 
decades, only modest expressions of 
concern (by Donald Kelley, for example, 
or Anthony Padgen), or restatements of 
older positions.
One such restatement has recently been 
published by the master of the history of 
early modern British political thought, 
Quentin Skinner. Intellectual history 
remains, according to Skinner, a poorly 
articulated field of research. In part this 
is because of its dispersal across the dis-
ciplinary landscape. In terms of objects, 
Skinner reasserts the centrality of the 
great texts – it is mere philistinism to 
demand that Delft tiles be studied equal-
ly with (let alone instead of) Vermeer’s 
paintings. In terms of method, he reas-
serts contextualism against reception 
history – the meaning that counts in 
the author’s intentional meaning – and 
the history of ideas against social his-
tory – the impact of a text or the breadth 
of its dissemination is entirely irrel-
evant to its intellectual history; in other 
words, the measure of the importance 
of an idea is independent of the power 
it historically exerted. Lastly, the under-
standing of ideas is not about capturing 
some transhistorical essence of mean-
ing; it must be resolutely historicist and 
centered on their discursive deployment 
in their original context. This alone ena-
bles us to see the web of what Skinner 
describes as the contingencies that pro-
duced the understandings with which 
we ourselves now operate, and to enable 
us to frame new ones.
Now of course these are the ideas that 
Quentin Skinner has defended so bril-
liantly for the past 40 years. And they 
are good ideas, to be sure – who doesn’t 
accept contextualism these days, if they 
are at all serious about historical knowl-
edge? But they are old ideas that have 
become static, old answers to old ques-
tions. Furthermore, they are not the 
only ones on offer, and the dismissal 
of these others may have something 
to do with the gradual erosion of intel-
lectual history itself for the perception 
is widespread that intellectual history 
is arrogantly elitist, brutally historicist, 
narrowly textualist, unreflexively great-
man-ist (and great-man-ist), and of 
course, preternaturally idealist. Some of 
this critique is clearly unfair – intellec-
tual history is by definition concerned 
with texts and ideas, after all – but oth-
ers hit closer to home. Gadamer, for 
example, makes the reception-history of 
a text an essential – if not the essential – 
dimension of meaning, and integral to 
this process is what he calls the ‘applica-
tion’ of the text, its truth for us. Foucault 
almost completely erases agents and 
their intentions from intellectual his-
tory, to say nothing of demonstrating 
the value of supplementing the great 
texts with the most pedestrian kinds of 
data. And measuring the importance of 
an idea independently of its historical 
power (though in fact we only read Hob-
bes because he in fact exerted historical 
power) is, as Pagden has observed, pre-
cisely the position that would be contest-
ed by social history, which has sought to 
substitute the history of mentalities (the 
real thought worlds of ordinary people) 
for the textualised thoughts of the elite. 
If Padgen is right in saying that intel-
lectual history is at a kind of crossroads 
and needs to establish a secure identity 
in order to advance, it will be useful 
for us to remain as conceptually alert 
as possible about what we are doing in 
our master class. Overcoming western 
national traditions of scholarship by 
globalizing the conversation and over-
coming Europe by including the non-
West (so Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann) 
are obvious moves, though whether 
there are specific methods for achiev-
ing such overcoming is open to serious 
discussion (one that has so far yet to 
be opened). In addition – though this 
is hardly a very revolutionary sugges-
tion – intellectual history has to mean 
exploring (textualised) thought in rela-
tion to historical change not just in rela-
tion to change in other thought, which 
seems to me only part of the story, but 
in relation to change in the society 
and polity within which that thought 
occurs. Intellectual history is concerned 
with more than speech acts and autho-
rial intentions; it is also concerned with 
social practices. And its context is more 
than linguistic and intellectual; it is also 
institutional and political. 
This linkage brings intellectual history 
closer to Reinhart Koselleck’s Begriffsge-
schichte. This proximity is a good thing. 
For starters, intellectual history can 
derive support from Koselleck’s argu-
ments for the central place of concep-
tualisation in social practices: ‘Nothing 
can occur historically that is not appre-
hended conceptually.’ In other words, 
you cannot do history and not do intel-
lectual history. But more than this, there 
is a mutually constitutive relationship 
between the history of thought and the 
history of social action; social history 
itself is in part the story of the redefini-
tion of the concepts that make present 
social life intelligible. The way forward 
in both intellectual and social history 
may lie in recognising that we must not 
choose – and indeed, typically do not 
anyway choose – between them. This 
seems to be a lesson the best intellectu-
al historians today have learned without 
perhaps having the faintest idea what 
the term Begriffsgeschichte means.
To compare or not is also not 
a choice
Like intellectual history but perhaps 
even more so, comparison in the 
human sciences experienced a stunning 
decline in popularity in the past genera-
tion. The reasons for this, too, are not 
far to seek. They are related to a gen-
eral antipathy toward master narratives, 
hard laws, reified categories, which are 
statically unhistorical, falsely evolution-
ist, and regressively universalist. Such 
resistance to comparison, however, is 
based on an overly narrow view of what 
comparison is for – and perhaps even 
on an illusion, namely, about whether 
we even have a choice whether or not 
to compare. In fact, I am becoming per-
suaded not only that we cannot not do 
intellectual history, but when we do do 
it, it must be comparative.
That comparison is a cognitive neces-
sity is becoming increasingly obvious 
to scholars, though a full-scale exposi-
tion remains a real desideratum. It is 
not only intrinsic to social analysis but 
to lived social experience (so Rogers 
Brubaker). Inequality, for example, is 
a social category that rests entirely on 
comparative grounds. True, one dan-
ger in comparative work is the natu-
ralisation of the unit of analysis (eg, 
the nation-state), but this is neither 
inherent in nor specific to comparison. 
However, another danger that is specific 
to comparison is the often unreflective 
generalisation based on a single case. 
In the very act of generalising that case 
as the unit of analysis, you are already 
suppressing, or potentially suppress-
ing, elements of difference. But this 
may be nothing more than a variant of 
the hermeneutic circle, and not a neces-
sarily vicious one, which we can correct 
as we tack between the first and second 
order case.
If comparison is everywhere, we need 
to make our inevitable but implicit com-
parisons explicit and to try to explain 
what role they are playing in the inter-
pretation of our primary object. In the 
case of ‘early modern knowledge’, the 
comparative instances we typically 
foreground, or at least those that Ben 
Elman and I do (see ‘Further Reading’), 
are western European, for two, unequal 
reasons: first, those instances are in the 
heads of those two particular observers, 
and inexpugnably so, when approaching 
China and India; they are the embedded 
comparative other. Second, through the 
force of colonialism and modernisation, 
western knowledge in many domains 
has been victorious, and we want to try 
to figure out what secured this victory. 
Yet that is not the only comparative 
move we want to make. Comparison 
of non-western forms of knowledge in 
the early modern world has additional 
goals, to which we can proceed only 
by way of intentionally bracketing the 
western model. The cases that consti-
tute the objects of our intellectual history 
are forms of systematic thought that are 
found everywhere literate culture itself 
is found. Our comparative intellectual 
history posits the importance of synchro-
nicity among these cases but makes no 
a priori claims that synchronicity entails 
symmetry; in fact, asymmetries are as 
important and revealing as anything. 
How comparable forms of thought 
change in time, change differently, or 
do not change at all, and why they do or 
do not change, is what this kind of his-
torical inquiry seeks to understand. Not 
only is chronology central to our com-
parative practice, but no models should 
be held to be universal, as instances of 
necessary regularities. On the contrary, 
what we want is comparison without 
hegemony.
It is vitally important that the synchro-
nicity grounding comparative intel-
lectual history contain no necessary 
content of this or any other sort. We 
make no assumption of unidirectional 
change and do not look for it; we make 
no assumption of a world system of 
intellectual modernity in which eve-
ryone participated, as some believe 
was the case with the world system 
of capitalism. Indeed, economic and 
intellectual history are not necessarily 
isomorphic. We might set out to write a 
history of early modern capitalism but 
it would be wrong-headed to set out to 
write a global history of ‘early modern 
thought’ as if we knew in advance what 
that singular entity was, and as if the 
descriptor ‘early modern’ was not just 
a temporal marker, but also a concep-
tual marker. This is precisely the defi-
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nitional trap that we saw lies in wait. 
Avoiding it and its hegemony means 
avoiding the one model of modernity 
that chanced to succeed; it means re-
defining modernity so that it is not 
about fossil fuels, parliamentary gov-
ernment, and secularisation, but a 
completely open category waiting to be 
filled with local content generated by 
empirical work. 
When we compare the intellectual his-
tories of the early modern world, what 
is it precisely that we want to know 
or do? Validate a hypothesis over N 
cases? Develop causal accounts of big 
structures and processes? Differenti-
ate cases? The first is the goal of com-
parative history; the second, the goal 
of comparative sociology. For us the 
most effective comparative intellectu-
al histories are going to be of the last 
type, which (as Peter Baldwin explains) 
ignores generalisation and seeks to cap-
ture similarities and differences across 
a limited number of instances in order 
to understand the cases under discus-
sion, to isolate from the incidental what 
is ‘crucial’ and possibly, though less 
likely, what is ‘causal’. 
The world that intellectuals across the 
globe inhabited and sought to know 
changed indubitably and radically in the 
period standardly called early modern. 
The master class participants want to 
know how those intellectuals respond-
ed, how their responses might compare 
with each other in different places, how 
similarly or dissimilarly their responses 
transformed the great intellectual tradi-
tions to which they were heir. The ques-
tion to ask is not ‘How modern is it?’ 
– that’s the hegemonic comparison we 
need to consciously bring to the table 
and examine critically. The question 
to ask instead is whether intellectual 
modernity may have had different char-
acteristics and histories in different 
parts of the world, including the history 
of kaozheng xue, ‘evidential scholarship’, 
in China, of tajdid, ‘renewal’, and tahqiq, 
‘verification’, in the Middle East, and of 
‘newness’, navyata, in India; and more, 
whether in those histories possibilities 
for a modernity different from the capi-
talist variety may once have been con-
tained. <
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Early Modern Classicism and 
Late Imperial China
Most historians treat late imperial China, 1400-1900, as a time of fading and decay. Indeed, 
viewed backwards from the Opium War (1839-1842) and Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), 
events before 1800 appear to have left China unprepared for modernity. But the 17th and 18th 
centuries can be considered not only as a ‘late imperial’ prelude to the end of traditional 
China, but as an ‘early modern’ harbinger of things to come.
Benjamin A.  E lman
By 1650 leading Chinese literati had decisively broken with the 
orthodoxy entrenched in official life 
and tipped the balance in favour of 
a ‘search for evidence’ as the key to 
understanding China’s past. Like Ren-
aissance Latin philologists, Chinese 
philologists exposed inconsistencies in 
contemporary beliefs. They were also 
prototypes of the modern philologist as 
moral reformer – radical conservatives 
who attacked the present in the name of 
the past. As scholarly iconoclasts they 
hoped to locate a timeless order in and 
prior to the classical antiquity of Confu-
cius (551-479 B.C.E.).
Until 1600, the ideal that motivated 
Chinese literati was sagehood. If every 
literatus was a virtuous exemplar, then 
society would prosper. Knowledge was 
equated to action, and political and cul-
tural stability depended on each indi-
vidual’s moral rigour. To buttress such 
claims, Chinese had by 1200 developed 
an interactive account of the heavens, 
earth, and human concerns. Ideally each 
person was a pivotal factor in a morally 
just and perfectly rational universe.
By 1750, however, the heirs of this 
entrenched moral orthodoxy formed a 
relatively secular academic community, 
which encouraged (and rewarded with 
livelihoods) original and rigorous criti-
cal scholarship. In contrast to their pred-
ecessors, late imperial literati stressed 
exacting research, rigorous analysis, 
and the collection of impartial evidence 
drawn from ancient artefacts and histor-
ical documents. Personal achievement 
of sagehood was by now an unrealistic 
aim for the serious classicist.
This philological turn represented 
a new, early modern way to verify all 
knowledge. The creation and evolution 
of this new scholarly community led to 
fresh intellectual impulses that recast 
the place of the literati scholar from 
sagely Mandarin to learned researcher. 
The major figures called what they 
did ‘evidential research’ (kaozheng 考
證, lit., ‘the search for evidence’), and 
for the most part they resided in the 
wealthy and sophisticated provinces 
in the Yangzi River delta. There they 
received, rediscovered and transformed 
the classical tradition. 
Their precise scholarship depended 
on a vibrant commercial and educa-
tional environment that rewarded cut-
ting edge classical studies with honour 
and prestige. Academic work as colla-
tors, editors, researchers, or compilers 
depended on occupationally defined 
skills that required thorough mastery 
of the classical language and a profes-
sional expertise in textual research. 
Practitioners were bound together by 
common elements in education and 
shared goals, which included the train-
ing of their successors in scholarly 
academies.
Classicism and commercial 
expansion after 1550
Besides academies and patronage, evi-
dential scholars also contributed to a 
growing network of bibliophiles, print-
ers, and booksellers who served their 
expanding fields of research. Libraries 
and printing were pivotal to the emer-
gence of evidential scholarship in the 
Yangzi delta. Scholars shared a com-
mon experience in acquiring philo-
logical means to achieve classical ends. 
This experience touched off differences 
of opinion and led to reassessments of 
inherited views. Supported by regional 
commerce and local trade, early modern 
communications grew out of the pub-
lishing industry in late imperial China. 
As China’s population grew, the reach of 
the late imperial bureaucracy declined. 
Many literati wondered whether the 
classical orthodoxy still represented uni-
versal principles at a time when goods 
and art were financially converted into 
objects of wealth paid for with imported 
silver. Late imperial literati were living 
through a decisive shift away from their 
traditional ideals of sagehood, morality 
and frugality. Landed gentry and mer-
chant elites transmuted the classical 
ideal of the impartial investigation of 
Setting movable type in the Qianlong Imperial Printing Office. Qinding Wuying dian juzhen ban 
chengshi (Beijing, 1776). Elman, Benjamin A. 2005. On their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550 -1900. p. 18
A number of ideas in the foregoing essay are developed in greater detail in ‘Introduction’, in 
Forms of Knowledge in Early Modern South Asia, ed. Sheldon Pollock (Durham: Duke U. Press, 
forthcoming) and in ‘Comparison without Hegemony: The Logic and Politics of a Comparative 
Intellectual History of Early Modern India’, in History and Indian Studies, ed. Claude Markovits 
et al. (forthcoming).
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